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Abstract 
Productivity has recently slowed down in many economies around the world. A crucial challenge in 
understanding what lies behind this “productivity puzzle” is the still short time span for which data can be 
analysed. An exception is Italy where productivity growth started to stagnate 25 years ago. Italy therefore offers 
an interesting case to investigate in search of broader lessons that may hold beyond local specific cities. We find 
that resource misallocation has played a sizeable role in slowing down Italian productivity growth. If 
misallocation had remained at its 1995 level, in 2013 Italy's aggregate productivity would have been 18% higher 
than its actual level. Misallocation has mainly risen within sectors than between them, increasing more in 
sectors where the world technological frontier has expanded faster. Relative specialization in those sectors 
explains the patterns of misallocation across geographical areas and firm size classes. The broader message is 
that an important part of the explanation of the productivity puzzle may lie in the rising difficulty of reallocating 
resources between firms in sectors where technology is changing faster rather than between sectors with 
different speeds of technological change. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many advanced economies have experienced a serious productiv-
ity slowdown. As Figure 1 shows, in the US, the Eurozone and the UK total factor
productivity is still below the pre-global financial crisis level. In 2016, US labor pro-
ductivity growth fell into negative territory for the first time in the last three decades
(Conference Board, 2016) and productivity has reached the headlines of global me-
dia, which have started focusing on “The productivity puzzle that baﬄes the world’s
economies”.1 These trends are particularly worrisome because productivity lies at the
heart of long-term growth.
A crucial challenge in understanding what lies behind this productivity puzzle is
the still short time span for which data can be analysed. As Fernald (2014) and Cette
et al. (2016) point out, in some countries like the US, the productivity slowdown dates
back a few years before the crisis. However, in Italy this is a much longer standing
issue. Figure 2 shows a growth accounting decomposition for Italy over the past four
decades and the results are quite emblematic. TFP growth shrank throughout the
decades, becoming negative in the 2000s. Italy turned from being among the fastest
growing EU economies into the “sleeping beauty of Europe”, a country rich in talent
and history but suffering from a long-lasting stagnation (Hassan and Ottaviano, 2013).
TFP dynamics in the manufacturing sector, where measurement issues are less binding
than in services, captures well the timing of the Italian decline. Figure 3 shows a
dramatic slowdown in TFP growth since the mid-Nineties for Italy compared to France
and Germany, where TFP continued to grow up to the global financial crisis.2
The relatively long time-series dimension that characterises the Italian productiv-
ity slowdown makes Italy a relevant case-study for analysing the key features of the
productivity decline (and draw policy recommendations) that can be of general inter-
est to other countries. We analyse the firm-level dimension of aggregate productivity
and focus on the concept of resource “misalocation” and its impact on productivity.
The “productivity” we refer to is Total Factor Productivity (henceforth, simply TFP),
1The Financial Times, 29th May, 2016.
2In the paper we focus on firms in the manufacturing sector, because firm-level TFP measurement
is less controversial than in services due to better accounting of the capital stock. We have run the
same analysis also for firms in the service sector and comparable results are quite similar.
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which measures how effectively given amounts of productive factors (capital and labor)
are used. Clearly the economy’s aggregate TFP depends on its firms’ TFP. This hap-
pens along two dimensions. On the one hand, for given amounts of factors used by each
firm, aggregate TFP grows when individual firm TFP grows, for example thanks to
the adoption of better technologies and management practices. If market imperfections
prevent firms from seizing these opportunities, the economy’s productive apparatus is
exposed to obsolescence and senescence with adverse effects on aggregate TFP.
On the other hand, for given individual firm-level TFP, aggregate TFP depends
on how factors are allocated across firms. As long as market frictions “distort” the
allocation of product demand and factor supply away from high TFP firms towards low
TFP rivals, they lead to lower aggregate TFP than in an ideal situation of frictionless
markets. Building on the distinction, introduced by Foster et al. (2008), between
physical TFP (TFPQ or simply TFP, i.e., measured as the ability to generate physical
output from given inputs) and revenue TFP (TFPR, i.e., measured as the ability to
generate revenue from given inputs), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) construct a model of
monopolistic competition in which, although firms can differ in their physical TFP, in
the absence of frictions TFPR is the same for all firms. The idea behind this result is
simple: with no frictions, the marginal revenue product of inputs should be equalized
across firms as factors move from low to high marginal revenue product firms. As
marginal revenue product equalization implies TFPR equalization, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) call deviations from a situation in which TFPR is equalized “misallocation”,
and propose a simple way to measure its consequences on aggregate TFP. This is also
the definition of “misallocation” we adopt. It implies that the dispersion of TFPR
across firms can be used to measure the extent of misallocation. It also implies that
firms with a TFPR higher than the sectoral average are inefficiently small, while those
with a TFPR below the sectoral average are inefficiently large. These are the two key
implications of the misallocation literature that we use in this paper.
With these definitions in mind, we study the universe of Italian incorporated com-
panies over the period 1993-2013 and find strong evidence of increased misallocation
since 1995. If misallocation had remained at its 1995 level, in 2013 aggregate TFP
would have been 18% higher than its current level. This would have translated into
1% higher GDP growth per-year, which would have helped to close the growth gap with
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France and Germany. The main source of misallocation comes from the within industry
component rather than the between component: misallocation has mainly risen within
sectors than between them, increasing more in sectors where the world technological
frontier has expanded faster. Relative specialization in those sectors explains the pat-
terns of misallocation across geographical areas and firm size classes with misallocation
increasing particularly in the Northern regions and among big firms, which tradition-
ally are the driving forces of the Italian economy. The broader message is that an
important part of the explanation of the recent productivity puzzle may lie in a gener-
ally rising difficulty of reallocating resources between firms in sectors where technology
is changing faster rather than between sectors with different speeds of technological
change. This implies that moving factors of production from e.g. textile into IT would
increase aggregate productivity less than ensuring that the most efficient firms within
textile are the ones that absorb more resources.
In the wake of Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004) we measure the speed
of technological change in a sector by the average change of R&D intensity between
1987-1993 and 1994-2007 in advanced countries.3 We find a positive and significant
correlation between the increase in R&D intensity in advanced countries and the in-
crease in misallocation in Italian sectors. Once we account for the sectoral composition
of Italian regions and firm size classes, the implied “frontier shocks” are the strongest
for Northern regions and big firms, thus matching the relative increase in misallocation
across geographical areas and firm sizes.
The analysis of firm characteristics associated with firms being inefficiently sized
sheds additional light on the relation between exposure to frontier shocks and misalloca-
tion within industries. In particular, we look at corporate ownership and management,
finance, workforce composition, internationalization and innovation. We find that firms
more likely to be keeping up with the technological frontier are inefficiently small and
thus under-resourced. These are the firms that employ a larger share of graduates and
invest more in intangible assets. On the contrary, firms less likely to be keeping up are
inefficiently large and thus over-resourced. These are the firms that have a large share
3R&D intensity is measured as the share of R&D expenditure over value added at the sectoral level.
Data are from the ANBERD database of the OECD. We exclude Italy from the sample and, following
Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004), the countries that we consider are Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
Results hold also when we take R&D intensity in the US only.
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of workers under a wage supplementation scheme, that are family managed, and that
are financially constrained. We interpret this as evidence that rising within-industry
misallocation is consistent with an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to
firms due to their heterogeneous ability to respond to sectoral “frontier shocks” in the
presence of sluggish reallocation of resources.
A concern with our quantification exercise relates to measurement error in firms’
revenues and inputs. As Bils et al. (2017) point out, mismeasurement is likely to distort
the misallocation analysis as a firm’s TFPR is higher when revenues are overstated
and/or inputs are understated: if, for example, the extent of revenue overstatement
(input understatement) systematically grows (falls) with firms’ true revenues (inputs),
the dispersion of measured TFPR is unequivocally biased upward. Bils et al. (2017)
suggest to tackle this issue by exploiting the fact that measurement error introduces
spurious correlation between firms’ TFPR and input growth. When we implement
their suggested correction for this possible bias, we find that the fraction of observed
misallocation reflecting sheer mismeasurement amounts to around 45% on average
This fraction is, however, relatively constant over our sample period, implying that,
although the level of misallocation is affected by measurement error, its change through
time is mostly unaffected.
Another potential sticking point concerns our reading of what we find in the data.
The very idea of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) of interpreting the entire observed dispersion
of TFPR across firms as evidence of inefficiency is contentious. Asker, Collard-Wexler
and De Loecker (2014) argue that, in the presence of adjustment costs in investment
(“time-to-build”), idiosyncratic TFP shocks across firms naturally generate dispersion
of the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK). In this case, as long as adjustment
costs are determined by technological factors, the dispersion of MRPK is an efficient
outcome and thus the observed gaps (“wedges”) in MRPK should not be taken as ev-
idence of any misallocation. In this respect, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) neglect the dis-
tinction between technology-driven adjustment costs, such as the natural time needed
to build a new plant, and wasteful frictions, such as the bureaucratic procedures of
authorisation that may delay the construction and activation of a new plant.
To explore whether time to build hides behind our findings, we explore the station-
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arity of firm TFPR relative to industry average, which should converge towards one
over time if the adjustment process after a TFP shock is the main driver of TFPR
dispersion. We first check the variance ratio statistics (Cochrane, 1988; Engel, 2000)
finding that the variation in relative TFPR across firms tends to stabilise in a time
horizon of around fifteen years, which is too long to be consistent with a dominant
adjustment cost story. We then run a series of unit root tests (Choi, 2001; Im, Pesaran
and Shin, 2003). We find relative TFPR to be stationary and not mean reverting. This
also lends support to the conclusion that increasing time-to-build cannot be the key
driver of what we see in the data.
From a different angle, De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) and Haltiwanger (2016)
argue that a reduction in the observed wedges does not necessarily imply more market
efficiency. For example, if firms had the same TFP but different initial market power
due to demand characteristics, convergence of market power to the top would reduce
TFPR dispersion but could be hardly considered an improvement in efficiency. While
we adopt the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) interpretation for ease of comparison with the
bulk of the literature on misallocation, it should nonetheless be remembered that the
changing wedges in marginal revenue products and TFPR we observe in the data could
also be partially due to changing market power across firms.
Our work relates to a number of studies that have used the framework of Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) to measure the extent of misallocation in various countries, such
as Bellone and Mallen-Pisano (2013), Bollard et al. (2013), Ziebarth (2013), Chen
and Irarrazabal (2014), Crespo and Segura-Cayuela (2014), Dias et al. (2014), Garcia-
Santana et al. (2016), and Gopinath et al. (2017). Our paper is also related to studies
that have analysed more specifically the issue of the Italian productivity slowdown since
the 1990s, such as Faini and Sapir (2005), Barba-Navaretti et al. (2010), Bugamelli et
al. (2010), Bugamelli et al. (2012), Lusinyan e Muir (2013), Michelacci and Schivardi
(2013), De Nardis (2014), Lippi and Schivardi (2014), Pellegrino and Zingales (2014),
Bandiera et al. (2015), Calligaris (2015), Daveri and Parisi (2015), Linarello and
Petrella (2016) and Calligaris et al. (2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodolog-
ical approach. Section 3 presents the main features of the database. Section 4 reports
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our aggregate findings on productivity and misallocation. Section 5 estimates the im-
pact of misallocation on aggregate TFP. Section 6 discusses the markers of misallocated
firms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Measuring misallocation
We follow Hsieh and Klenow (2009; henceforth HK) in defining ‘misallocation’ as an
inefficient allocation of productive factors (labor and capital) across firms with different
TFP.4 Inefficiency is defined with respect to the ideal allocation of factors that would
result in a world of frictionless product and factor markets where consumers are free
to spend their income on the firms quoting the lowest prices and owners of productive
factors are free to supply the firms offering the highest remunerations. In this ideal
allocation the value of the marginal product (‘marginal revenue product’; henceforth
MRP) of each factor is equalized across firms so that the factor’s remuneration is the
same for all firms. This is an equilibrium as consumers have no incentive to change
their spending decision, firms have no incentive to change their production decisions
and factor owners have no incentive to change the provision of their services. It is also
a stable equilibrium as any exogenous shock creating gaps in a factor’s MRP across
firms would trigger a reallocation of that factor from low to high MRP firms until its
remuneration is again equalized across all firms.
Shocks that can create such gaps are idiosyncratic shocks that increase the TFP of
some firms relative to others. As firms with higher MRPs after the shocks are able to
offer higher factor remunerations at the pre-shocks equilibrium allocation, they have the
opportunity to expand their operations by attracting additional factor services away
from less productive firms until convergence in factors’ MRPs restores the equalisation
of factor remuneration across firms in the new post-shocks equilibrium. In this respect,
observed gaps in factors’ MRPs across firms reveal ‘distorted’ factor allocation across
them as factors are inefficiently used. This inefficient allocation of resources is what
4The only quantitative results from Hsieh and Klenow (2009) we will use are those on the computa-
tion of TFPR and factors’ marginal revenue products. As these follow standard textbook definitions,
we provide here only a qualitative discussion of the logic of the HK approach, referring interested
readers to the original paper for additional details.
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HK call ‘misallocation’ and its extent can be measured by the width of the observed
gaps (‘wedges’) in factors’ MRPs between firms. It implies that, though offering higher
remunerations, more productive firms are not able to attract the factors they would
need to grow and thus remain inefficiently small. Vice versa, though offering lower
remunerations, less productive firms are inefficiently large.
The dispersions of marginal revenue products map into the dispersion of ‘revenue
TFP’ (TFPR). Under the HK assumptions more dispersion of TFPR is, in turn, asso-
ciated with more inefficient allocation and lower welfare (‘misallocation’).5 If we use
TFPRsi to denote the TFPR of firm i in sector s and TFPRs to denote the sectoral
average, then TFPRsi/TFPRs > 1 implies that the firm is inefficiently small and
should be allocated more inputs in order to be able to increase its output and decrease
its price until TFPRsi/TFPRs = 1. Conversely, TFPRsi/TFPRs < 1 implies that
the firm is inefficiently large and should be allocated less inputs in order to be able to
decrease its output and increase its price until TFPRsi/TFPRs = 1. The dispersion
of TFPRsi around TFPRs has a direct impact on sectoral TFP as the latter can be
expressed in terms of the ideal level of sectoral TFP that would be achieved under the
efficient allocation of resources minus the observed variance of firm TFPR in the actual
allocation.6
Accordingly, sectoral misallocation can be measured in terms of sectoral TFPR
dispersion as
V ar(TFPRs) =
Ns∑
i=1
V Asi
V As
(
TFPRsi − TFPRs
)2
where V A is value added and Ns is the number of firms in sector s . Analogously,
overall misallocation in the economy can be measured in terms of aggregate TFPR
dispersion as
V ar(TFPR) =
S∑
s=1
V As
V A
(
TFPRs − TFPR
)2
.
5As discussed in the Introduction, this is not necessarily the case when markups vary across firms
(Asker, Collard-Wexler, De Loecker, 2014), or firms incur adjustment costs in reacting to idiosyncratic
shocks (De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014; Haltiwanger, 2016).
6 For our purposes it is conceptually crucial to measure TFPR based on cost shares as in HK rather
from the residual of a firm-level production function estimation as in the productivity literature in IO
(Foster et al., 2017).
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where S is the number of sectors. On the othet hand, we are interested not only in
understanding the extent to which aggregate dispersion is driven by variations between
and within sectors but also between and within geographical areas or firm size groups.
Using g to denote an area/size group, TFPRgsi will refer to the TFPR of firm i in
sector s and area/size group g and Ngs to the number of firms in that sector and group.
Aggregate TFPR dispersion in the economy can then be decomposed into within-group
and between-group components as
V ar(TFPR) =
G∑
g=1
V Ag
V A
S∑
s=1
V Ags
V Ag
Ngs∑
i=1
V Agsi
V Ags
(TFPRgsi − TFPRgs)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(TFPR)gs︸ ︷︷ ︸
(TFPR)g︸ ︷︷ ︸
WITHIN-GROUP
+
+
G∑
g=1
V Ag
V A
S∑
s=1
V Ags
V Ag
(TFPRgs − TFPR)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
BETWEEN-GROUP
,
(1)
where G is the number of area/size groups. In (1) the overall TFPR variance is
decomposed in two parts: a weighted average of the within-group squared deviations
from the group mean, and a weighted average of the squared deviations of the group
means from the overall mean. Specifically, the within-group component represents a
weighted average of the group-specific variances, in turn expressed in terms of weighted
averages of the variance within the sector-specific TFPR distributions within the group.
The weights are calculated in terms of value added.
When the economy is considered a single area/size group (so that the number of
groups is equal to one), the within-group component boils down to a simple within-
sector component, consisting of a weighted average of the within-sector variances:
V ar(TFPR) =
S∑
s=1
V As
V A
Ns∑
i=1
V Asi
V As
(TFPRsi − TFPRs)2. (2)
This is the expression we use to measure aggregate misallocation for the economy.7
7The same measure is used by HK (2009), although they do not weight across units (i.e. the shares
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3 Data description
We use two main databases. The first covers the universe of incorporated companies
(CERVED) with information from firms’ balance sheets that we use to compute ag-
gregate misallocation.8 This database accounts for 70% of manufacturing value added
from national accounts and the growth rate follows very closely the national one. Then,
in order to analyse the firm-level features of misallocation, we rely on a representative
sample of firms with more detailed information on firms’ characteristics that we use to
analyse firm-level misallocation (INVIND). We group manufacturing firms into 3-digit
sectors using the ATECO 2002 classification, which allows us to distinguish detailed
categories such as ‘machines for producing mechanic energy’, ‘machines for agriculture’,
‘tooling machines’, ‘machines for general use’, etc.9
In order to compute firm-level measures of TFPR as in HK, we need measures of
output as well as of labor and capital inputs. We measure the labor input using the cost
of labor and the capital stock using the book value of fixed capital net of depreciation,
while we take firms’ value added as a measure of the total revenue of the model as this
does not consider intermediate inputs. All variables are deflated through sector-specific
deflators (with base year 2007). We clean the database from outliers by dropping all
observations with negative values for real value added, cost of labor or capital stock.
We are left with a pooled sample of 1,740,000 firm-year observations for manufacturing
over the period 1993–2013. The average number of observations per firm is 12. To
compute firm-level TFPR we also need capital and labor shares at industry level. We
compute the labor share by taking the industry mean of labor expenditure on value
added measured at the firm level. We then set the capital share as one minus the
computed labor share.
V Asi/V As). Thus, compared to HK, our measure assigns more importance to misallocation in larger
firms.
8This database includes also micro enterprises with less than 10 employees.
9The total number of 3-digit sectors is 91. We also use a more aggregate classification at 2-digit
and results hold. We exclude ‘coke and petroleum products’ and ‘other manufacturing n.e.c.’ from
manufacturing. These sectors have peculiar behaviors, whose study lies outside the scope of this
paper.
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The second dataset is the main one we use for the analysis of firm-level misallocation
is the Bank of Italy’s annual “Survey of Industrial and Service Firms” (INVIND). We
focus on the open panel of representative Italian manufacturing firms with at least
50 employees. The survey contains detailed information on firm revenues, ownership,
production factors, year of creation and number of employees since 1984. Additional
information is drawn from “Centrale dei Bilanci” (CB), which contains balance sheet
data on around 30,000 Italian firms. INVIND data are matched with those from CB
using the tax identification number of each firm. We drop observations pre–1987, in
order to have a proper sample coverage, as well as those not matched with CB data.
We are left with a pooled sample of 19,924 firm-year observations over the 25-year
period 1987–2011, with an average of 11 observations per firm. We divide the INVIND
panel in low-tech and high-tech sectors using the OECD classification of manufacturing
industries according to their global technological intensity, based on R&D expenditures
respect to value added and production.10
Table 1 presents sectoral descriptive statistics from CERVED at 2-digits for average
real value added, capital stock and cost of labor over the period of observation, both in
absolute terms and in percentages with respect to the total.11 The sectors ‘machinery’,
‘metals’ and ‘textile and leather’ are the sectors with the largest numbers of firms and
represent 62% of the total number of manufacturing firms. Real value added ranges
from a mean of around 0.8m Euro in ‘wood’ to around 4.4m Euro in ‘vehicles’. Variation
in the average capital stock is sizable, ranging from around 1m Euro in ‘textile and
leather’ to around 4.9m Euro in ‘vehicles’. The cost of labor varies notably too, ranging
between 0.5m Euro in ‘wood’ and 3.2m Euro in ‘vehicles’.
In order to better understand the pattern of misallocation, we divide the dataset
10High-tech industries include firms that produce office, accounting and computing machines; ra-
dio, TV and communication equipment; aircraft and spacecraft; medical, precision and optical instru-
ments; electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers; chemicals
excluding pharmaceuticals; rail-road equipment and transport equipment n.e.c.; and machinery and
equipment n.e.c. Low-tech industries account for firms that work in building and repairing of ships
and boats; rubber and plastic products; other non-metallic mineral products; basic metals and fab-
ricated metal products; wood, pulp, paper; paper products; printing and publishing; food products;
beverage and tobacco; textiles; and leather and footwear.
11We present the descriptive statistics for 2-digit sectors for ease of exposition, but the quantitative
analysis is at 3-digit level.
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into geographic and firm size cells. In particular, we group firms within each industry
into four main Italian macro-areas: Northwest, Northeast, Center, South and Islands.12
We also divide the firms in the dataset into four groups according to firm size: ‘micro’,
‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘big’.13 We report the summary statistics of the main variables
divided by geographic area and size, both in absolute terms and percentages, in Table
2. Around two thirds of manufacturing firms are located in the Northern areas of the
country. In these areas, manufacturing firms’ value added, capital stock and cost of
labor are higher than the average. Looking at firm size, more than 88% of manufactur-
ing firms are ‘micro’ or ‘small’, while only 2.2% are ‘big’. However, ‘micro’ and ‘small’
firms account for only around 30% of total value added and input costs, whereas big
firms account for around 45%.
In Table 3 we present the summary statistics of firms clustered by sector-area and
by sector-size. For most of the industries the majority of firms are located in the
North. Moreover, practically all sectors are composed mainly by ‘micro’ and ‘small’
firms, with the majority of bigger manufacturing firms concentrated in ‘chemicals’,
‘food and tobacco’ and ‘vehicles industries’. Table 4 shows the relevance of firm size by
geographic area. In the Northwest more than half of the value added in manufacturing
comes from ‘big’ firms. Finally, Table 5 looks at the distribution of value added by
firm size across geographical areas. About 56% of value added produced by big firms
in the manufacturing sector comes from the Northwest, this confirms a strong overlap
between the Northwest region and big firms.
12We use the ISTAT (National institute of Statistics) classification of macro-areas. “Northwest”
includes the regions Liguria, Lombardy, Piedmont and Aosta Valley; “Northeast” includes Emilia-
Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-South Tyrol and Veneto; “Center” includes Lazio, Marche,
Tuscany and Umbria; “South and Islands” includes Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise,
Apulia, Sicily and Sardinia.
13We use the European Commission classification of firms according to their turnover. “Mi-
cro” are firms with a turnover < 2m Euros, “small” < 10m Euros, “medium” < 50m Euros,
“big” > 50m Euros. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/
sme-definition/index_en.htm.
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We first investigate the misallocation pattern in the manufacturing sector by com-
puting the TFPR variance as described in Equation (2). The output of this exercise
(in logs) is depicted in Figure 4, where we also report the average TFPR based on the
same weighting scheme used for the variance. The figure shows that a large decline
in average TFPR occurred in the mid-nineties, followed by a temporary recovery from
2005 to 2007 and a new fall associated with the economic crisis with a drop of about
-10.5%. Moreover, aggregate misallocation (as measured by the variance of TFPR)
steadily and steeply increased between 1995 and 2009 and slightly decreased after its
peak in 2009. However, aggregate misallocation increased by almost 69% between 1995
and 2013 with most of the increase taking place in the first decade.14
To better understand the firm-level dynamics behind the aggregate patterns dis-
played in Figure 4, we compare the firm-level distributions of TFPR in 1995 with that
in 2013. This comparison, reported in Figure 5, shows quite clearly that the evolution
of TFPR highlighted above (i.e. decreasing average and increasing variance) mainly
occurred through a rising share of low productivity firms. When the comparison is
made, instead, between 2007 and 2013 (see Figure 6), the difference in the share of
low productivity firms is much less pronounced. In fact, recalling what we have seen
in Figure 4, 2007 represents a critical year for average TFPR but not for its variance
as this grows until 2009. Figure 7 shows the evolution of aggregate misallocation, cap-
tured by the variance of TFPR over the full sample of firms per-year. We can see that
misallocation raised sharply from 1995 to 2009, when it started a process of slow re-
version. This suggests that the aggregate decrease in TFPR occurred in the last years
compounds a long-run increase in misallocation with a crisis-related fall in average firm
productivity.
In principle, the increasing misallocation pattern documented in the aggregate
might hide substantial differences across sectors, areas and firm size categories. How-
ever, before going into the details of each dimension, we implement the decomposition
in Equation (1) in order to understand to what extent aggregate misallocation can be
14In order to have some insight about the trend of misallocation before 1993, we also use the
INVIND database which starts in 1987–2011, but accounts for a more limited sample of firms above
50 employees. This longer database confirms that the rise of misallocation is a phenomenon that
started in the mid-’90s and it was not a previously undergoing trend. In INVIND misallocation has a
similar trend with respect to CERVED, although the raise starts a couple of years later in 1997 and
is quantitatively stronger.
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4 The patterns of aggregate misallocation
traced back to differences in terms of TFPR dispersion across the categories. In Figure
8 we report the computed within and between components of aggregate TFPR vari-
ance for the three dimensions, along the whole period under consideration (1993–2013).
The message is clear-cut as the between component is always small compared with the
within component with only slight differences emerging across the three dimensions
(see Figures 9 and 10). Moreover, since the between components start growing only
after 2000, the increase in aggregate variance occurred between 1995 and 2000 is al-
most entirely driven by the within components. We wonder whether this pattern is
driven by firms’ entry and exit, so in Figure 11 we disentangle the pattern of within
misallocation for firms that are always in our data set (balanced panel) and for the full
sample that accounts also for entry and exit. Even if the level of misallocation is lower
for the balanced panel, the trend of misallocation is qualitatively very similar in both
samples. However, from a quantitative point of view, after 1995 misallocation increases
more significantly for the balanced panel than for the full sample; this implies that if
anything, the process of entry and exit is dampening the raise of misallocation, which
is consistent with the findings of Linarello and Petrella (2016).
As shown by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), TFPR can be expressed as a geometric
average of the marginal product of capital (MRPK) and labor (MRPL). Hence the
dispersion of TFPR and our measure of misallocation are going to be proportional to
MRPK and MRPL. Figure 12 looks at the patterns of MRPK and MRPL dispersion and
it shows that capital is the factor of production that experiences the sharpest increase
in its marginal product’s dispersion since the mid-1990s, although this pattern has
flattened out since the global financial crisis. To some extent the dispersion of MRPL
increased too, but it does not show a striking trend.15 This seems to suggest that the
capital market is a very important source of misallocation in Italy.
A first source of concern is that capital may be subject to adjustment costs (“time-
to-build”) that can lead to a higher dispersion simply due to a technology-driven ad-
justment process, which would be an efficient outcome. In order to explore whether
time to build can be a driver of our findings, we explore the stationarity of our firm-
15If we look at the change of the distribution of MRPK and MRPL between 1995 and 2013, we
see that MRPK experienced a fattening of both tails and it kept a very similar mean; whereas,
the distribution of MRPL experienced a clear leftward shift with a significant decrease of the mean.
Results are available upon request.
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level misallocation measure ln
(
TFPRis/TFPRs
)
. The idea is that this ratio should
converge towards one over time if the adjustment process after a TFP shock is the main
driver of TFPR dispersion. Firstly, we consider the variance ratio statistics (Cochrane,
1988; Engel, 2000), defined as V ar(Xt+k −Xt)/V ar(Xt+1 −Xt), where X denotes the
relative log-TFPR averaged across sectors. For stationary series, the variance ratio
approaches a limit. The output of this exercise is reported in Figure 13. The pat-
tern suggests that the variation in firm-level misallocation tends to stabilise in a time
horizon of around fifteen years, which is a too long period for being consistent with
an adjustment cost story. We also run a series of unit root tests to investigate the
mean reversion property of this ratio. Table 6 reports the the Im-Pesaran-Shin (Im
et al., 2003) and the Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) tests for the presence of unit root. The
null hypothesis is rejected in all cases, entailing the series to be stationary and firms’
relative TFPR not being mean reverting.16
Another source of concern is related to measurement error in firms’ revenues and
inputs. As Bils et al. (2017) point out, this is likely to distort the misallocation anal-
ysis. In fact, a firm’s TFPR is higher when revenues are overstated and/or inputs are
understated: if, for example, the extent of revenue overstatement (input understate-
ment) systematically grows (shrinks) with firms’ true revenues (inputs), the dispersion
of measured TFPR is unequivocally biased upward. Bils et al. (2017) suggest to tackle
this issue by exploiting the intuition that, while without measurement error revenue
growth solely depends on TFPR and input growth, the presence of measurement error
introduces spurious correlation between firms’ TFPR and input growth. Their sug-
gested methodology allows us to evaluate the fraction of observed TFPR dispersion
reflecting the actual presence of distortions. In our estimation based on Bils et al.
(2017), this fraction amounts to 0.54, suggesting that more than fifty per cent of our
measured misallocation is not driven by measurement error and can thus be regarded
as true misallocation.17 More interesting for us, this fraction is relatively constant over
time (if anything slightly increasing) over our sample period, suggesting that, although
the level of misallocation has to be taken with caution, our discussion about the trend
in misallocation is mostly unaffected by measurement error issues.
16Analogous conclusions can be reached by carrying out the tests on the log-TFPR series.
17 Bils et al. (2017) find that this ratio is 0.23 for the US,
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5 Insights from regional and size patterns
To better understand the geographical distribution of the aggregate pattern, we
report the evolution of misallocation within macro-regions – i.e. the term V ar(TFPR)g
– in Figure 14.18 We note that i) TFPR in the South is on average always lower
than in the rest of Italy; ii) misallocation in the Northwest and the Center grew at
a considerably higher rate compared to the other areas; and iii) misallocation in the
South was higher than in the rest of Italy at the beginning of the period but, being quite
stable over time, ends up being lower than in the North at the end of the period.19.
The same analysis can be carried out in terms of firm size categories (see Figure 15)
and an important highlight is that misallocation grew in all groups but it affected more
heavily the bigger firms.
These results are puzzling because firms in the Northwest region and bigger firms
are traditionally more advanced and closer to the technological frontier. However,
this reveals important insights on the overall dynamics of misallocation. A possible
explanation for the raise of misallocation is that, for given level of frictions, the shocks
hitting firms have become more dispersed; this might be the result of a fast changing
technological frontier (due for instance to the IT revolution). To explore this possibility
we build on Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004) and look at the average change
of R&D intensity between 1987-1993 and 1994-2007 in advanced countries as a proxy of
shocks to the technology frontier by sector. We measure R&D intensity as the share of
R&D expenditure over value added at the sectoral level. The countries we consider are
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and United States. Results hold also if we take R&D intensity in
the United States only. Data are from the ANBERD database of the OECD.20 Figure
16 shows that there is a positive and significant correlation between the increase in
the R&D ratio in advanced countries and the increase in misallocation, such that an
increase in R&D intensity by one standard deviation is associated with an increase
18The underlying is assumption is that within sector misallocation should be less problematic within
macro regions than at the national level, as moving factors should have lower adjustments costs. This
exercise allows us to understand the geographical distribution of misallocation.
19For ease of exposition we do not show the graphs of group-specific distributions, but they support
this finding.
20This is measured as the share of R&D expenditure over value added at the sectoral level. Data
are from the ANBERD database of the OECD.
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in misallocation of 0.14 standard deviations (statistically significant at the 1% level).
Moreover, once we account for the sectoral composition of regions (or firm size), it
turns out that the implied “frontier shock” is higher in the Northwest (4.6%) and the
Center (5.1%) and lower in the Northeast (3.1%) and the South (2.2%). This follows
the ranking of the increase in misallocation by region highlighted above. The same
result applies if we look at the implied shock by firm size.
An implication of this result is that firms in the upper part of the productivity
distribution should be those that contribute more to the overall increase in misalloca-
tion. This is indeed the case, as shown by the contribution of each firm quartile to
the overall increase of misallocation in our sample.21 As we can see the top quartile
is the one that contributes the most the rise of aggregate misallocation. The produc-
tivity thresholds of firms entry and exit do not exhibit a particular trend, but they
are subject to standard year-to-year oscillation. On average, firms that enter a market
are 20% more productive than the average firm in that sector, whereas firms that exit
the market are 40% less productive than the average firm (Figure 17). This suggests
that movements of the cut-off for firms entry and exit are unlikely to drive the rise of
misallocation, which is actually the result of increased dispersion in the top quartile of
the distribution.
6 The impact of misallocation on aggregate TFP
The overarching message sent by the battery of figures and tables presented in the
previous section is that overall the stagnation of Italian productivity since the 1990’s
has been accompanied by a steady increase in misallocation. We now quantify the
impact that the increase in misallocation had on aggregate TFP during our period of
observation. In particular, we want to understand how much aggregate TFP in 2013
would have changed if misallocation had remained constant at the 1995 level.
21The standard deviation of log-TFPR is about 0.4 for firms in the top quartile and it is increasing
over time. For firms in the 2nd and 3rd quartile it is slightly increasing after the crisis, but its level is
low (0.1). Finally for firms in the bottom quartile, the dispersion if higher (0.6), but it is stable up to
the crisis and then decreases. The top and the bottom 1% of the distribution are trimmed from our
sample
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In the wake of HK, we proceed as follows. First, in each year t from 1995 to 2013
we evaluate the increase in aggregate output that could be achieved by completely
eliminating misallocation (i.e. by reallocating productive factors so as to equalize their
remunerations across all firms). In any given year, within the HK framework that
increase is dictated by the ratio between the observed aggregate output level Y and
the efficient aggregate output level Y ∗ in the absence of gaps in factor remunerations.
We can, therefore, evaluate the percentage increase in aggregate productivity that
could have been achieved in any year t by completely eliminating misallocation as:
% Gaint/within =
(
Yt
Y ∗t
)−1
− 1 (3)
Second, to understand how much aggregate TFP in year t would have changed if
misallocation had remained constant at the 1995 level, we can look at the percentage
relative change in the efficient-to-observed output ratios in the two years:
% Gaint/95 =
(
Yt/Y
∗
t
Y95/Y ∗95
)−1
− 1 (4)
When applied to our data, equation (4) implies that, if misallocation had remained
at its 1995 level, in 2013 aggregate TFP would have been 18% higher than its ac-
tual level. Moreover, the effect of misallocation on TFP peaked in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis leading to a 23% foregone productivity gain, but weak-
ened slightly after the Euro-debt crisis. So, even after netting out the spike in the
productivity penalty of misallocation associated with the crisis, the adverse effects of
misallocation on Italian productivity remain sizeable.22
From a size class and geographical perspective, the observed patterns are mainly
driven by misallocation across big firms and by firms in the Northwest. In fact, in the
22The quantitative results of this exercise are sensitive to the values chosen for the elasticity of
substitution σ between products sold by firms. In the baseline we set σ equal to 3 as in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). This is a conservative value also in light of Broda and Weinstein (2006) who find that
for SITC-3 digits the average value of the elasticity of substitution after 1990 is about 4. Higher value
of the elasticity deliver stronger gains. The gain would be to 12% with σ equal to 2, and 19% with σ
equal to 4.
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cases of big firms and the Northwest, TFP would have been 18% and 25% higher if
misallocation in 2013 had stayed at its 1995 level.
7 Productivity, misallocation, and firm character-
istics
In the previous section we have documented the important role played by rising
misallocation across Italian firms in the dismal evolution of Italian productivity since
the 1990’s. We have highlighted that the main source of misallocation comes from a
within industry component, especially in sectors where the world technological frontier
has expanded faster. Relative specialization in those sectors explains the patterns of
misallocation across geographical areas and firm size classes: accounting for the sectoral
composition of Italian regions and firm size classes implies that “frontier shocks” are
the strongest for Northern regions and big firms. This matches the relative increase in
misallocation across geographical areas and firm sizes.
To shed additional light on the relation between exposure to frontier shocks and mis-
allocation within industries, we now investigate which firm characteristics (“markers”)
are associated with firms being inefficiently sized. We look in particular at corporate
ownership and management, finance, workforce composition, internationalization and
innovation. In doing so, we rely on reduced form regressions at the firm level. The
econometric specifications that we implement allow us to identify correlations, but
not causation, of key firm characteristics with a firm’s TFPR relative to its sectoral
average. In particular, we run the following regression:
ln
TFPRist
TFPRst
= β0 + β1Xist + δt + γs + εist, (5)
where i, s and t refer to firm, sector and year respectively; Xist is the marker (or vector
of markers) we want to analyze23; δt is a year dummy that captures common shocks to
all firms in a given year; γs is a sector fixed effects controlling for time-invariant sector
characteristics that can influence the effect of the marker on misallocation; εist is the
error term. This regression relates the log-ratio of a firm’s TFPR to the average TFPR
23For robustness, we also enter the markers with a squared term in order to allow for non-linearity.
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of its sector with the chosen marker (or vector of markers). Thus, if our estimates
point to β1 > (<)0, we can conclude that firms with larger Xist are characterized by
higher (lower) relative TFPR.
In equation (5) the main variable of interest is marker Xist. Its coefficient β1 could
be zero in two different scenarios. First, it would be zero if the aggregate allocation of
resources were efficient, as TFPRis/TFPRs = 1 would hold for all firms. As we have
already seen, this is not the case in our data. Second, even if the allocation of resources
were not efficient, β1 would be zero if Xist did not directly affect relative TFPR. As in
the end only the second scenario is relevant, we can conclude that a non-zero estimate
for β1 reveals that the marker increases misallocation.
24 In particular, larger (smaller)
values of the marker lead to more misallocation for positive (negative) estimated β1.
In other words, if the estimated β1 is positive, firms with relatively large Xist are
inefficiently small; vice versa, if the estimated β1 is negative, firms with relatively large
Xsit are inefficiently large.
Our benchmark specification is based on standard pooled OLS regression, always
including sector and year dummies.25 We have also run a number of different speci-
fications, including additional controls, lagged regressors, and firm effects. Moreover,
we have run these regressions by geographic area, firm size, and low- vs. high-tech
sectors.26 While the corresponding results are available upon request, for parsimony
we provide here a synthetic description of the most robust and policy relevant findings
based on the benchmark case with our aggregate sample.
For each marker, we run regression (5). Moreover, following HK, we infer the
firm-level output and capital distortions (“wedges”) and we use them as alternative
24In Calligaris et al. (2016) we show that a marker could still be linked to misallocation even if β1
were zero, if it is related to the dispersion of the residuals of equation (5). We have checked whether
this is the case and found no evidence, which implies that β1 6= 0 is the necessary and sufficient
condition for a marker to induce misallocation. We omit these results for parsimony but they are
available from the authors on request.
25With respect to our aim of investigating the markers of misallocation, the most appropriate
specification does not include firm fixed effects. In fact, we are mainly interested in how cross-firm
differences in relative TFPR are related to given firm characteristics. We are less concerned with the
effects of the within-firm variation in those characteristics across time.
26We use the OECD classification of manufacturing industries according to their global technological
intensity, based on R&D expenditures with respect to value added.
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dependent variables in (5).27 There is a higher capital distortion when the ratio of
labor compensation to the capital stock is high with respect to the one we would expect
from the industry output elasticities relative to capital and labor. In order to interpret
the regressions, it is important to keep in mind that capital and labor distortions are
each other’s mirror image, as a high labor distortion would show up as a low capital
distortion. This implies that a positive and significant coefficient of the capital wedge
on marker Xist, reveals that X is associated to higher capital distortion relative to
labor (without implying that labor distortion is zero) so that capital compensation
is too low relative to labor compensation, given the output elasticities of these two
factors. A negative and significant coefficient means instead that firms characterised
by marker X tend to suffer from high labor distortion relative to capital, so that labor
compensations are too low relative to capital. Similarly, the output wedge is large
when the labor share is small given the industry elasticity of output with respect to
labor.
Therefore, we run regression (5) using as dependent variable not only relative
TFPR, but also the output wedge and the capital wedge. The independent variables
(“markers”) we use refer to a series of usual suspects that include various proxies
for ownership, finance, labor force, innovation, foreign exposure, and cronysm. The
variables are listed in Table 7 and we discuss them in the corresponding subsections.28
7.1 Corporate ownership/control and governance
We construct an indicator of ownership type, distinguishing between firms con-
trolled by an individual or a family, a conglomerate, a financial institution, the public
sector or a foreign entity. As Michelacci and Schivardi (2013) already found that fam-
ily firms tend to choose activities with a lower risk/return profile compared to firms
27Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that for firm i in sector s the capital and output distor-
tions (‘wedges’) can be computed as τKis = αswLis/ [(1− αs) RKis] − 1 and τY is = 1 −
σwLis / [(1− σ)(1− αs)PisYis].respectively, where w is the wage, R is the rental rate of capital,
Pis is price of output and αs is the capital share of firm expenditures.
28In order to check if our results are driven by the financial crisis, we run all regressions also up to
2008 only. Results are very similar qualitatively, quantitatively, and in terms of statistical significance.
The only difference is for the regression on delocalisation, whose coefficient turns to be statistically
significant, but very similar in magnitude.
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controlled by other entities, we expect family firms to have lower relative productivity
and thus to be inefficiently over-resourced with respect to other firms. This is exactly
what we find by regressing the relative TFPR on dummies for each ownership type,
using family controlled firms as the reference group (Table 8).
Specifically, we find that firms controlled by either a financial institution, a group,
or a foreign company have between 3% and 8% higher relative TFPR than family
controlled firms (column 1). Differently, we do not find any statistical difference of rel-
ative TFPR between public and family controlled firms. This implies that for instance
foreign controlled firms are too small and should be allocated more resources than
family owned firms. Column 2 of Table 8 confirms this finding by showing that these
types of firms suffer from higher output distortion with respect to family owned firms.
Moreover, column 3 highlights that these firms specifically suffer from an additional
distortion in terms of capital-labor ratio. In particular the negative coefficient implies
that they suffer more strongly of labor distortions and they should increase the labor
compensation with respect to capital, i.e. absorb a higher share of workers.
Reading these fundings through the lenses of the HK framework, they imply that
aggregate productivity would likely increase if family firms and government controlled
firms were acquired by private groups or foreign entities. On the other hand, keeping
corporate ownership unchanged, aggregate productivity would increase if misallocation
were reduced within all corporate ownership categories with the largest productivity
gains coming from firms controlled by groups and foreign entities.29
7.2 Finance
In the case of finance, we investigate the relevance of credit constraints, equity
emissions and relational banking. We also explore the impact of the introduction of
29Although the database is not representative in terms of young firms, we looked at the relationship
between age and relative TFPR. We did not find any significant relationship when only linear terms
are considered. Things seem to change substantially when we allow for a squared term. In that
case, our regression results suggest that the relation between relative TFPR and age are U-shaped.
Unfortunately, the nature of our database prevents us from performing a robust analysis of other
aspects of governance.
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the Euro on firms’ financial characteristics.
a. Credit constraint
We define credit constrained firms as those that declared that they would have
liked a higher level of debt (Table 9 ). We also use an alternative measure of credit
constraint based on the willingness of having more credit even at higher interest rates,
which delivers the same results.30 Both measures enter the regression with a lag in
order to mitigate endogeneity. In this way we capture how being credit constrained at
time t− 1 is correlated to TFPR and misallocation at time t.
In particular, we find that firms that are credit constrained at time t − 1 tend to
have lower relative TFPR at time t.31 This implies that credit constrained firms are
absorbing too many resources and should downsize, so in this sense the “right” firms
seem to be financially constrained. Moreover, Column 2 shows that credit constrained
firms are characterized by a negative and significant output distortion; this is equivalent
to saying that these firms are actually receiving an implicit subsidy, so it would be more
efficient if they exited the market. Finally, in credit-constrained firms the capital-labor
ratio is not significantly distorted.
b. Equity
We look at the relation of firms’ relative TFPR and distortions with the timing of
their equity emissions. In particular, we look at the correlation between relative TFPR
at time t and equity emissions at time t− 1, t, and t+ 1. In Table 10 we report results
for time t only, but there is virtually no difference with the other timings. We find
that firms that have lower relative TFPR in a given year tend to issue more equity
(either in the same year, the year after or the one before). This may suggest that
equity issuance may be a relevant source of funding when firms are hit by a negative
productivity shock, but at the same time it may also mean that equity buyers are not
allocating capital efficiently as these firms are too large given the productivity they
have and should absorb fewer resources.
30Results available upon request
31This effect is particularly pervasive in low-tech industries.
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An important issue about the effect of the Euro on productivity and misallocation
relates to the interest rate convergence that characterised peripheral countries thanks
to the common currency. The traditional argument, as in Gopinath et al. (2015)
and Benigno and Fornaro (2014), is that the availability of cheaper funds led to a
misallocation of capital towards low productive firms that rather than exiting the
market increased their leverage. We do not provide a formal test of this hypothesis,
but we look for observationally consistent facts. For instance, if this were the case,
we should observe a significant increase in leverage for firms with lower relative TFPR
after the introduction of the Euro.32
In Table 11 we can see that high leverage indeed characterizes lower TPFR firms.
This relation becomes significantly stronger after national exchange rate parities were
fixed to the Euro in 1999. This is consistent with the fact that the interest rate con-
vergence that followed the introduction of the Euro led to a misallocation of credit to
less productive firms that are disproportionately large given their productivity. Not
surprisingly, we also observe that more leveraged firms are characterised by a misallo-
cation of the capital-labor ratio as the share of capital is too large. However, this effect
did not increase significantly after the Euro.
d. Relational banking
We consider a firm as being involved in ‘relational banking’ if it declares that the
principal reason for dealing with its main bank is “personal relationship and assistance”.
In Table 12 we observe that relational banking is associate with lower relative TFPR,
so that the firms that engage in relational banking are larger than what they should
optimally be. This suggests that relational banking might be a key motivation for low
productive firms to choose a specific bank, perhaps because it grants more support
in time of need. Hence, relational banking may be a drag on aggregate productivity
because it diverts resources from more productive firms with weak banking connections
to less productive firms with strong banking connections.
32Leverage is defined as debt over total assets. By looking at this variable we check if firms’ debt
increased disproportionately with respect to total assets during the period of cheap credit that followed
the introduction of the Euro.
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c. Euro effect
7.3 Workforce composition
The functioning of the labor market is one of the structural features of the Italian
economy that has been more extensively reformed since the 1990s.33 Misallocation is
less likely to emerge when less productive firms are free to reduce (and more productive
firms are free to increase) the amount of labor. In this perspective, by introducing more
flexibility in the labor market, the reforms that the Italian economy underwent in the
1990s should have induced a better allocation of labor. In this section we analyse
the relation between firms’ workforce and misallocation from different perspectives. In
particular we look at the Italian Wage Supplementation Scheme, which is the main
instrument of labor hoarding that firms use. We also look at the shares of temporary
and foreign workers that firms hire; and we analyse the role of skill intensity among
both blue- and white-collars.
a. Wage Supplementation Scheme (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni - CIG)
Firstly, we look at how intensively firms resorted to the Wage Supplementation
Scheme (“Cassa Integrazione Guadagni” - CIG) (variable “CIG share” - hours of CIG
over total hours worked). When firms are in distress, they can use this scheme to hoard
labor, so that workers suspend temporarily their job and receive a public benefit. The
key characteristic of this scheme is that it protects not only the worker, but also the
specific job match between worker and firm. This scheme can have either a positive or
negative effect on misallocation, because it facilitates labor hoarding guaranteeing to
firms and workers a useful buffer in downturns, but at the same time it might end up
protecting a job match that would be more efficient to break. Our methodology allows
us to understand in which direction productivity and misallocation are affected by this
specific policy tool.
33Two major reforms of the labor market took place: the Treu Law and the Biagi Law. The
former was introduced in 1997 (law 196/97) with the aim of making the Italian labor market more
flexible. The main novelty of the Treu Law consisted in the introduction of temporary contracts and
in the creation of Temporary Work Agencies (jobcenters were privatized and decentralized). The
Treu Package also modified the discipline of fixed-term contracts, modified the regulation related to
employment in the research sector and rose from 22 to 24 the age limit for apprenticeship contracts.
The Biagi Law, introduced in 2003 (law 30/03), created new contractual forms and renovated some
existing ones, mainly affecting the subordinated workers.
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Table 13 shows that the firms that use the CIG more intensively are largely over-
resourced and their size should be smaller than what it currently is. There is also a
positive and significant correlation with output distortion implying that these firms
are receiving an implicit subsidy, which is indeed the case. Finally, our results show
that, as it might be expected, firms using the CIG suffer from a larger labor distortion
relative to capital.
These findings support the idea that less productive firms are more likely to take
advantage of the CIG and that, through the associated (temporary) reduction in la-
bor costs, the CIG works against the reduction of the amount of labor used by low
productivity firms, thereby fostering misallocation especially on the labor side.34
b. Temporary workers
Table 14 and 15 analyze the association of temporary and foreign workers with
our measures of misallocation. We construct the two variables “term empl share” and
“foreign empl share”. The former is expressed in terms of the ratio of the number of
temporary employees to the total number of employees at the end of the year. The
latter is, instead, measured as the ratio of the average number of foreign workers to the
average number of workers in a given year. Our sample begins from 1999 for temporary
workers and from 2003 for foreign workers.
We find that firms that use a higher share of temporary workers have higher relative
TFPR, so they are inefficiently under-resourced and their size should be larger than
what it actually is.35 At the same time, these firms suffer from a significantly stronger
distortion on capital inputs relative to labor (while we do not find a significant associ-
ation with output distortions). A possible explanation could be that more productive
34To go more into the details of these relationships, we build the variable “YearSwitch CI”, taking
value one in the year in which the firm starts resorting to CIG, and run contemporaneous and one-year
lagged fixed effects regressions, finding that the decision to start using CIG is associated with lower
relative TFPR.
35These findings support the idea that higher TFPR firms are more likely to take the opportunity of
resorting to temporary work. This result is in sharp contrast with Daveri and Parisi (2015), who find
a negative correlation between a firm’s share of workers in a temporary contract and its productivity.
However, the different productivity measure and the different time period (2001–2003 in their case)
may explain the difference.
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firms find stronger distortions in the capital market and, given the complementarity
between capital and labor, they tend to respond favoring a higher share of temporary
and more flexible workers.
As for foreign workers, we do not find that this marker is significantly associated
with misallocation. The coefficient on relative productivity in Table 15 is not statis-
tically different from zero. However, we find some positive and significant correlation
with the capital distortion, which signals that firms relying more on foreign workers
tend to suffer from stronger capital distortions relative to labor. Nevertheless, this
does not result into broader misallocation.
c. Skill intensity
We look at two measures of skill-intensity: the share of white collars holding a
degree (Table 16) and the share of blue collars holding a degree (Table 17). We are
able to observe these two variables only in 2010 and 2011, thereby we run a cross-section
regression for the two years together.36
Firms with a higher share of high skilled workers among white collars have higher
TFPR on average, hence they should be allocated more inputs to increase their size.37
These firms suffer also from a large output distortion and from a relatively larger
distortion for labor relative to capital, where the labor distortion could be related to
both skilled and unskilled labor. However, if we look at the share of skilled workers
among blue collars, we do not find any significant association with misallocation or
output distortion, but only a marginally significant association with stronger distortions
in labor input relative to capital.
7.4 Internationalization
We focus on two main dimensions of firms’ internationalisation, delocalisation and
foreign direct investment. In Table 18 we look at the correlation between misallocation
36We also run the regressions for the two years separately and the results are similar.
37This result is particularly strong for big firms and for low-tech firms.
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and wether firms delocalized part of their production process, whereas in Table 19 we
look at the correlation between FDI and misallocation. In both cases we do not find
evidence of resource misallocation for firms engaging with these types of international
activities with respect to those that do not. This does not imply, however, that within
those groups there is nomisallocation, but given the low number of observations, we
do not have enough power to analyse this aspect.
Another stylized fact about productivity and internationalisation is the well-known
higher productivity of the exporting firms, as compared to non-exporters. Given the
nature of our sample, in which more than 80% of the firms export, we have to some-
how take this evidence for granted. We have nonetheless considered the intensity of
the export activity, measured in terms of the export share of revenues, finding some
evidence of a positive relationship with relative TFPR.38
7.5 Innovation
Innovation is a fairly reasonable marker of both productivity and misallocation.
The relationship can in principle go both ways. On the one hand, innovation can be
thought to foster productivity; on the other hand, more productive firms (e.g. Melitz,
2003) and/or firms with higher revenues (e.g. Bustos, 2011) can display a higher
propensity to innovate. If the innovation choice is made in a dynamic context with
adjustment costs for capital, a positive relationship with misallocation can be expected
(Asker, Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2014). To investigate the role of innovation,
we consider the share of intangible assets (associated, essentially, with R&D, marketing
and branding) on firms’ total assets.
Table 20 shows that a higher share of intangible assets is associated with higher
relative TFPR.39 This implies that firms that invest more in innovation tend to be
under-resourced and should have larger size. Moreover, these firms tend to suffer from
a larger distortion in the allocation of capital relative to labor. This is consistent with
38The variability in the data does not allow for a proper analysis of this issue. Given the low
variability in the data, the relationship emerges only when controls are introduced for the export
share in t− 1 and t+ 1, or the nonlinearity in the relationship is taken into account.
39We also enter the regressor with a lag and the results are very similar.
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the view that credit provision to firms that innovate may play a key role in reducing
misallocation.
While our database does not allow us to address innovation using alternative and
more focused measures, this evidence is in line with recent studies on the productivity
effects of intangible assets, such as Battisti, Belloc and Del Gatto (2015), who find
that these assets are positively associated with both TFP and technology adoption,
and suggest a key role of firms’ innovation choices as markers of misallocation.
7.6 Combining markers: a short horse-race
We complete our investigation of the firm markers associated with relative produc-
tivity and misallocation by running the regressions on different subsets of indepen-
dent variables entered simultaneously. This should give some guidance on the relative
importance of these variables. More specifically, we look at the share of graduates
among white collars, innovation, family ownership, reliance on the wage supplementa-
tion scheme (CIG), and the share of temporary employment. We focus on variables
that are available over subsequent years and are consistently part of our panel and not
just of some year-specific cross-section. There might be some concern of collinearity be-
tween the variables we consider. Hence, Table 21 looks at the cross-correlations among
these variables showing that correlations are never above 0.27 (in absolute value), which
reveals a low degree of collinearity.
Table 22 summarises the main results. As some of the variables are dummies
(i.e. “family ownership”), whereas the others are continuous variables, comparing
the magnitude of the coefficients is difficult. Hence, we focus more on their relative
statistical significance. The results show that the share of graduates among white
collars and the use of the wage supplementation scheme (CIG) are the statistically most
significant markers of misallocation, although of opposite sign (firms with a high share
of graduates are too small and those using the CIG are too large). Family ownership
and, to some extent, innovation are also two significant markers with opposite signs.
However, the share of temporary workers loses significance with respect to the results
presented in Table 14. In terms of output distortion, the most significant markers are
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again the share of graduates among white collars, which has a positive and significant
coefficient (implying an implicit tax), and the use of CIG, which has a negative and
significant coefficient (implying an implicit subsidy). Finally, in terms of the capital-
labor ratio, innovative and family-owned firms are the ones with the strongest distortion
in terms of capital, whereas firms with a higher share of white-collar graduates confirm
to suffer from a significant distortion in terms of labor.
These findings, in particular the strong significance of the share of graduates among
white collars and the CIG, can be interpreted as two sides of the same coin. The share of
high-skill employees among white collars drives firm technological and organizational
innovation, which in turn increases firm productivity relative to competitors. In an
efficient process of creative destruction labor should seamlessly flow from firms with
falling relative productivity to firms with rising relative productivity thereby enhancing
aggregate productivity. This process of efficient reallocation is impaired if firms with
falling relative productivity can use the wage supplementation scheme to keep them
afloat when faced not only with contingent problems (as in the original spirit of the
CIG) but also with structural problems (as in the consolidated practice of the CIG).
More generally, our findings on the importance of the different markers suggest
that firms more likely to keep up with the technological frontier are inefficiently small
and thus under-resourced. These are the firms that employ a larger share of graduates
and invest more in intangible assets. On the contrary, firms less likely to keep up are
inefficiently large and thus over-resourced. These are the firms that have a large share
of workers under a wage supplementation scheme, that are family managed, and that
are financially constrained. We interpret this pattern as evidence that rising within-
industry misallocation is consistent with an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic
shocks to firms due to their heterogeneous ability to respond to sectoral “frontier
shocks” in the presence of sluggish reallocation of resources.
8 Conclusions and policy implications
We have provided a detailed analysis of the patterns of misallocation in Italy since
the early 1990s. In particular, we have shown that the extent of misallocation has
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substantially increased since 1995, and that this increase can account for a large fraction
of the Italian productivity slowdown since then. We have shown that the increase in
misallocation has mainly risen within than between sectors, increasing more witihin
those in which the world technological frontier has expanded faster.
We have highlighted that rising misallocation has hit firm categories that tradition-
ally are the spearhead of the Italian economy, in particular firms in the Northwest and
big firms. We have argued that relative specialization in sectors where the world tech-
nological frontier has expanded faster helps explaining the patterns of misallocation
across geographical areas and firm size classes. The broader lesson is that part of the
explanation of the recent productivity puzzle in other advanced economies may lie in a
generalised growing difficulty of reallocating resources between firms in sectors where
technology has been changing faster rather than between sectors with different speeds
of technological change.
We have shed additional light on the relation between exposure to “frontier shocks”
and misallocation within industries by investigating which firm characteristics are as-
sociated with firms being inefficiently sized. We found evidence that inefficiently small
under-resourced firms are those that, by employing a larger share of graduates and
investing more in intangible assets, are more likely to be keeping up with the tech-
nological frontier. Vice versa, inefficiently over-resourced firms are those that, being
featuring larger shares of workers under wage supplementation, more family managers
and stricter financial constraints, are more likely to be falling behind the technological
frontier. We have interpreted this pattern as evidence consistent with rising within-
industry misallocation being associated with increasing volatility of idiosyncratic shocks
to firms due to their heterogeneous ability to respond to sectoral “frontier shocks” in
the presence of sluggish reallocation of resources.
Our findings provide the ground for a policy-oriented discussion, to which we now
turn.
The main policy implications we highlight are the following:
• “Within-misallocation” matters more than “between-misallocation”:
This implies that, in order to raise productivity, rather than trying to switch
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resources between sectors, geographical areas and firm size classes, policy inter-
vention should aim at allocating capital and labor to the best performing firms
within these categories. Policy intervention should therefore focus less on moving
capital and labor from, e.g., textile to electronics, than on facilitating the mobil-
ity of workers and capital towards the most productive firms within the textile
sector. Similarly, higher benefits would be reaped by moving the factors of pro-
duction to the most productive firms within depressed geographical areas rather
than moving them to more vibrant areas. This represents both an opportunity
and a challenge. An opportunity, because moving factors within sector or area is
less costly than across them; but also a challenge, because it is harder to deter-
mine what prevents high-productivity firms from expanding and low-productivity
firms from shrinking within the same sector or geographical area. More generally,
setting the framework conditions for the proper functioning of market-driven re-
allocations could be more effective than pursuing traditional industrial policies
aimed at ‘picking the winning sectors/regions’.
• There are a “North issue” as well as a “Large firm issue”: The rise of mis-
allocation and the subsequent decline of productivity in the traditional ‘engines’
of the Italian economy should be a source of major concern. The regional di-
mension indicates that misallocation has increased particularly in the Northwest,
traditionally the core of the Italian productive system. And the size dimension
suggests that the increase has been particularly strong among large firms. The
two events are not unrelated, as the Northwest is where larger firms tend to be
headquartered. These trends indicate that a lot of attention should be devoted
to policies targeted at improving the efficiency of the allocative process within
the category of large firms, such as labor market regulation, antitrust rules and
the system of public subsidies.
• A larger share of firms survives despite low productivity levels: The
increase in misallocation is to a large extent due to the increase in the share of
firms that are inefficiently over-resourced. This fact points to the inefficiency of
the institutions and regulations that govern the process of firm restructuring. We
see as particularly relevant: a) the regulation of firm bankruptcy procedures and
the efficiency of the judicial system in reallocating the assets of distressed firms
- these aspects have been subject to various reforms in the recent past, whose
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results should hopefully become apparent over the next years. Developments
in this area should be closely monitored; b) the process of credit allocation by
banks that might lead to “zombie lending”, whereby credit is extended to low
productivity firms to keep them from going bankrupt; c) the diffusion of financial
operators specialized in firm restructuring and turnaround, such a private equity
firms - the market of private equity funds is still underdeveloped in Italy, possibly
due to their regulation and to the constraints on firm restructuring.
• The system of unemployment benefits needs to be reformed with more
focus on the “worker” than on the “job”: Our results show that the Italian
wage supplementation scheme (“Cassa Integrazione Guadagni”) is disproportion-
ately used by low productivity firms and is associated with higher misallocation.
The problem with this type of scheme is that it protects the job match between
workers and firms even if it is no longer productive. This hinders the process
of creative destruction that would lead to workers’ reallocation towards more
productive firms. This is especially the case whenever the scheme, rather than
being used as a temporary safeguard as in its original spirit, is used on a more
prolonged basis. In this respect, a universal unemployment benefit where unem-
ployed workers receive a subsidy, without preserving the job, could lead to less
misallocation of workers and higher productivity. This is the direction in which
recent reforms included in the Italian “Jobs Act” seem to be going.
• Investments in intangible assets are important: Our results show that
firms with a higher investment share in intangible fixed assets (such as R&D,
branding, and marketing) are more likely to be inefficiently under-resourced.
Public support to firms engaging this type of investments can provide impor-
tant incentives towards such productivity-enhancing activities; the recent Italian
public program called “Industry 4.0” goes in that direction. Another example of
reforms that could help along this dimension is the development of a non-banking
component of the financial markets. In fact, venture capital and private equity
could promote the access to credit by highly innovative, risky firms that would
be otherwise credit constrained.
• Graduates play a crucial role among white collars: Our results show that
firms with a higher number of graduates among their white-collars are inefficiently
under-resourced. Italy has a lower share of graduates than other European coun-
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tries. Pro-active policies that encourage more tertiary education are warranted.
Skill mismatches might be more likely among highly educated workers, because
firms find it hard to fill positions requiring a high level of specific skills with the
appropriate candidates. This calls into question both the “production” of human
capital through the school system and its “deployment” to firms through formal
placement networks.
Beyond Italian specificities, several of these implications may apply more broadly
to other advanced economies facing their own “productivity puzzles”.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for manufacturing.
Manufacturing Value Added Capital Cost of labor Obs.
Textile and leather 1,265 969 802 249,000
10.92% 8.86% 10.91% 16%
Paper 1,342 1,410 834 127,000
5.93% 6.6% 5.81% 8.2%
Chemicals 2,990 3,138 1,769 138,000
14.36% 15.96% 13.38% 8.9%
Minerals 1,790 2,451 1,075 96,000
5.97% 8.65% 5.65% 6.2%
Metals 1,426 1,436 909 319,000
15.81% 16.86% 15.88% 20.5%
Machinery 2,092 1,276 1,398 390,000
28.3% 18.29% 29.79% 25.1%
Vehicles 4,405 4,884 3,177 51,800
7.93% 9.31% 9.01% 3.3%
Food + tobacco 1,994 2,693 1,102 137,000
9.48% 13.56% 8.25% 8.8%
Wood 807 1,109 520 46,800
1.31% 1.91% 1.33% 3%
Note: Main variables expressed both in absolute values and in percentages of the total.
Absolute values are expressed in thousand of 2007 Euros.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for manufacturing, by geographic area and by
size.
Manufacturing Value Added Capital Cost of labor Obs.
B
y
g
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
re
a
Northwest 2,438 2,175 1,559 592,000
50.1% 47.35% 50.49% 38.1%
Northeast 1,921 1,689 1,196 416,000
27.71% 25.81% 27.19% 26.8%
Center 1,403 1,222 894 294,000
14.3% 13.2% 14.36% 18.9%
South and Islands 896 1,462 574 253,000
7.86% 13.6% 7.93% 16.3%
B
y
si
ze
Micro 267 263 193 902,000
8.37% 8.73% 9.51% 58%
Small 1,224 1,117 816 471,000
20.01% 19.34% 21.01% 30.3%
Medium 4,950 4,613 3,105 148,000
25.48% 25.15% 25.17% 9.5%
Big 39,400 37,700 24,000 33,700
46.14% 46.78% 44.31% 2.2%
Note:Main variables expressed both in absolute values and in percentages of the total. Ab-
solute values are expressed in thousand of 2007 Euros. Manufacturing firms dived into four
geographic areas and four firms sizes.
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Table 3: Percentages of manufacturing firms in each sector, by geographic
area and size.
Manufacturing Northwest Northeast Center South & Islands Micro Small Medium Big Tot.
Textile and leather 4.6% 3.4% 5.1% 2.9% 9.2% 5.0% 1.5% 0.2% 16.0%
28.6% 21.0% 32.2% 18.2% 57.4% 31.5% 9.7% 1.4% 100%
Paper 3.4% 1.8% 2.0% 1.1% 5.7% 1.9% 0.5% 0.1% 8.2%
41.1% 21.5% 24.6% 12.8% 69.7% 22.9% 6.2% 1.3% 100%
Chemicals 4.3% 2.1% 1.3% 1.2% 4.2% 3.1% 1.2% 0.4% 8.9%
48.4% 23.9% 14.8% 12.9% 47.6% 34.6% 13.8% 4.1% 100%
Minerals 1.3% 1.7% 1.4% 1.7% 3.5% 2.0% 0.5% 0.1% 6.2%
21.7% 27.7% 22.9% 27.8% 57.5% 32.0% 8.7% 1.8% 100%
Metals 9.0% 5.7% 2.9% 3.0% 12.8% 5.9% 1.5% 0.3% 20.5%
43.6% 27.7% 14.0% 14.7% 62.4% 28.9% 7.1% 1.5% 100%
Machinery 11.4% 8.0% 3.3% 2.3% 14.1% 7.9% 2.5% 0.5% 25.1%
45.6% 31.9% 13.3% 9.2% 56.4% 31.5% 9.9% 2.2% 100%
Vehicles 1.3% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 1.8% 1.0% 0.4% 0.1% 3.3%
38.2% 22.8% 18.4% 20.5% 54.6% 28.9% 12.3% 4.2% 100%
Food and tobacco 2.1% 2.3% 1.6% 2.8% 4.6% 2.7% 1.2% 0.3% 8.8%
24.2% 26.4% 17.8% 31.6% 52.0% 30.5% 13.6% 3.9% 100%
Wood 0.7% 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 2.0% 0.8% 0.2% 0.0% 3.0%
24.2% 33.3% 20.4% 22.2% 65.6% 28.2% 5.7% 0.5% 100%
Tot. 38.1% 26.7% 18.9% 16.3% 58.0% 30.3% 9.5% 2.2% 100%
Note:Percentages of firms in each group. Manufacturing firms dived into four geographic areas and four firms sizes. For each sec-
tor, the first line reports the group percentage with respect to the whole manufacturing, while the second one the percentage with
respect to the specific sector.
Table 4: Value added shares of manufacturing firms in each geographic area,
by size.
Manufacturing Micro Small Medium Big Tot.
Northwest 6.4% 17.5% 24.1% 52.0% 100.0%
Northeast 7.9% 21.7% 29.2% 41.2% 100.0%
Center 11.5% 21.7% 22.8% 44.0% 100.0%
South & Islands 18.3% 25.9% 25.2% 30.5% 100.0%
Note:Value added shares of firms in each group. Manufacturing firms dived
into four geographic areas and four firms sizes. For each geographic area, re-
ported the group percentage with respect to the specific size class.
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Table 5: Value added shares of manufacturing firms in size class, by geo-
graphic area.
Manufacturing Northwest Northeast Center South & Islands Tot.
Micro 37.6% 26.0% 19.4% 17.0% 100.0%
Small 43.6% 30.5% 15.6% 10.3% 100.0%
Medium 47.2% 32.1% 12.8% 7.8% 100.0%
Big 56.1% 25.0% 13.7% 5.2% 100.0%
Note:Value added shares of firms in each group. Manufacturing firms dived into four geographic areas
and four firms sizes. For each size class, reported the group percentage with respect to each geographic
area.
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Table 6: Unit root tests on relative TFPR
Test Statistic p-value
Im-Pesaran-Shin Statistic p-value
W-t-bar (a) -17.2958 0.0000
W-t-bar (b) * -63.9714 0.0000
Fisher-type, Augmented DickeyFuller (c)
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 5901.691 0.0000
Inverse normal -8.8742 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8669) -13.9079 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 29.0925 0.0000
Fisher-type, Augmented DickeyFuller (c) *
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 6539.15 0.0000
Inverse normal -12.8297 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8599) -19.645 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 36.7378 0.0000
Fisher-type, PhillipsPerron (d)
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 7465.222 0.0000
Inverse normal -21.5148 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8639) -29.4953 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 47.8446 0.0000
Fisher-type, PhillipsPerron (d) *
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 8073.704 0.0000
Inverse normal -26.0377 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8614) -35.8587 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 55.1425 0.0000
*Trend included
Serially correlated errors:
(a) 1.03 lags - chosen by AIC;
(b) 1.72 lags - chosen by AIC;
(c) 1 lag Augmented Dickey-Fuller;
(d) 1 lag Newey-West.
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Table 7: Description of main variables.
Variable Description
control 1 physical person, 2 holding, 3 Institution, 4 Public, 5 foreign
credit constraint1 desire to increase borrowing =1, 0 otherwise
credit constraint2 desire to increase borrowing even paying higher rates =1, 0 otherwise
increase equity if increase of equity=1, 0 otherwise
leverage leverage
post99 if year>1999=1, 0 otherwise
relational banking personal relations and support from the bank =1, 0 otherwise
CIG share hours of redundancy fund / hours worked
term empl share temporary work/ Total employment
foreign empl share average foreign employment/ average total employment
grad share1 share of graduates among white collars
grad share2 share of graduates among blue collars
foreign group if belongs to a foreign group =1, 0 otherwise
sub foreign 04 if sub-contractor for a foreign company =1, 0 otherwise, year 2004
sub foreign 07 if sub-contractor for a foreign company =1, 0 otherwise, year 2007
sub foreign 10 if sub-contractor for a foreign company =1, 0 otherwise, year 2010
deloc 04 if firm delocalizes part of its activity =1, 0 otherwise, year 2004
deloc 11 if firm delocalizes part of its activity =1, 0 otherwise, year 2011
fdi01 if there are FDI =1, 0 otherwise, year 2001
fdi02 if there are FDI =1, 0 otherwise, year 2002
fdi03 if there are FDI =1, 0 otherwise, year 2003
public adm sales Share of sales made with public administrations
intangibles share investments in intangibles/total investments
geographic area 4 geographic areas: Northwest (NW), Northeast (NE), Centre (Centre), South and Islands (South)
size 4 size classes: Micro, Small, Medium, Big
technological level 2 technological Intensity classes: low or med-low, med-high or high
Year Year in which the questionnaire was filled, from 1987 to 2011.
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Table 8: Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Relative TFPR Output Wedge Output Wedge Capital Wedge Capital Wedge
Family -0.0526*** - -0.0346*** - 0.209*** -
(0.0125) (0.00532) (0.0262)
Conglomerate 0.0582*** 0.0417*** -0.219***
(0.0147) (0.00593) (0.0291)
Financial Institution 0.0308* 0.0159* -0.133***
(0.0183) (0.00812) (0.0368)
Government -0.0237 -0.0169 -0.250***
(0.0326) (0.0160) (0.0547)
Foreign 0.0803*** 0.0498*** -0.238***
(0.0176) (0.00681) (0.0369)
Constant 0.107 0.0647 5.415*** 5.388*** 5.094*** 5.299***
(0.221) (0.219) (0.0464) (0.0456) (0.465) (0.469)
Observations 17,420 17,420 17,420 17,420 17,420 17,420
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.098 0.102 0.293 0.294
Sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 9: Credit constraints
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
credit constraint 1 [t-1] -0.0657** -0.0322** -0.00445
(0.0298) (0.0157) (0.0485)
Constant 0.658*** 5.537*** 6.516***
(0.0824) (0.0381) (0.152)
Observations 1,188 1,188 1,188
R-squared 0.155 0.132 0.375
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Table 10: Equity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Increased equity (at t) -0.0629*** -0.0305*** 0.000297
(0.0151) (0.00801) (0.0276)
Constant -0.147 5.258*** 4.635***
(0.240) (0.163) (0.439)
Observations 9,527 9,527 9,527
R-squared 0.035 0.076 0.255
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
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Table 11: Leverage Euro
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
leverage -0.381*** -0.0303 -0.979***
(0.0663) (0.0353) (0.133)
post99 -0.0206 0.105*** -0.260***
(0.0240) (0.0157) (0.0430)
leverage*post99 -0.197** -0.0708 0.176
(0.0966) (0.0460) (0.175)
Constant 0.0574*** 5.468*** 5.613***
(0.0201) (0.0149) (0.0352)
Observations 15,633 15,633 15,633
R-squared 0.037 0.119 0.314
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Table 12: Relational banking
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Relational banking -0.0823** -0.0202 -0.0273
(0.0336) (0.0257) (0.0600)
Constant -0.0183 5.388*** 4.541***
(0.0619) (0.0322) (0.126)
Observations 774 774 774
R-squared 0.080 0.148 0.335
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO
Table 13: Wage Supplementation Scheme
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Wag supplementation -0.425*** -0.165*** -0.515***
(0.0979) (0.0432) (0.0740)
Constant 0.0710 5.296*** 5.310***
(0.178) (0.121) (0.394)
Observations 19,078 19,078 19,078
R-squared 0.041 0.106 0.283
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
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Table 14: Temporary employment, share of total workforce
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Temporary employment share 0.116** -0.0398 0.597***
(0.0565) (0.0280) (0.120)
Constant -0.0687 5.384*** 4.832***
(0.173) (0.111) (0.375)
Observations 11,825 11,825 11,825
R-squared 0.028 0.072 0.246
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Table 15: Foreign employment, share of total workforce
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Foreign empoloyment share 0.127 -0.00505 0.705*
(0.140) (0.0513) (0.366)
Constant -0.116 5.352*** 4.997***
(0.219) (0.173) (0.469)
Observations 6,331 6,331 6,331
R-squared 0.037 0.073 0.238
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Table 16: Share of graduates, white collars
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Graduate share, white collars 0.359*** 0.105*** -0.241*
(0.0765) (0.0308) (0.133)
Constant -0.308 5.514*** 5.039***
(0.332) (0.0286) (0.630)
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412
R-squared 0.080 0.152 0.279
Sector FE YES YES YES
Cross section Year 2000 and 2010 2000 and 2010 2000 and 2010
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Table 17: Share of graduates, blue collars
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Blue collar graduate -0.234 -0.159 -1.092*
(0.421) (0.412) (0.571)
Constant -0.241 5.538*** 5.062***
(0.377) (0.0484) (0.643)
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,366
R-squared 0.059 0.143 0.278
Sector FE YES YES YES
Cross section Year 2000 and 2010 2000 and 2010 2000 and 2010
Table 18: Delocalization
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Engage in delocalization -0.00715 -0.000137 -0.0313
(0.0386) (0.0114) (0.0709)
Constant -0.206 5.519*** 4.921***
(0.457) (0.0495) (0.769)
Observations 655 655 655
R-squared 0.109 0.203 0.295
Sector FE YES YES YES
Cross section Year 2011 2011 2011
Table 19: FDI
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Engage in FDI 0.00640 -0.0137 0.0772
(0.0585) (0.0196) (0.115)
Constant -0.181*** 5.359*** 4.387***
(0.0313) (0.0250) (0.222)
Observations 201 201 201
R-squared 0.304 0.399 0.463
Sector FE YES YES YES
Cross section Year 2003 2003 2003
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Table 20: Innovation
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Intangible assets, share 0.144*** -0.00188 0.377***
(0.0381) (0.0160) (0.0688)
Constant -0.0796 5.377*** 4.849***
(0.176) (0.110) (0.398)
Observations 11,689 11,689 11,689
R-squared 0.030 0.071 0.247
Sector FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
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10 Figures
Figure 1: TFP pattern since the global financial crisis (2007=100)
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Data: Conference Board
Figure 2: Contribution to value added growth, Italy
Data: EU-Klems
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Figure 3: TFP in manufacturing for Italy, Germany and France (2005=100)
Source: Hassan and Ottaviano (2013)
Figure 4: Variance and average TFPR
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Figure 5: Distribution TFPR, 1995 and 2013
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Figure 6: Distribution TFPR, 2007 and 2013
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Figure 7: Evolution of aggregate misallocation, 1993-2013
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Figure 8: Misallocation, within vs. between categories (average 1993-2013)
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Figure 9: Evolution of within-misallocation by category
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Figure 10: Evolution of between-misallocation by category
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Data: CERVED
Figure 11: Evolution of misallocation, balanced vs. full-sample
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Figure 12: Evolution of misallocation, marginal product of capital and labor
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Figure 13: Variance Ratio of relative TFPR
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Figure 14: Evolution of misallocation by geographic area
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Figure 15: Evolution of misallocation by firm size
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Figure 16: Sector misallocation and World RD intensity
Data: CERVED and OECD
Figure 17: Productivity ratio of firms’ entry and exit with respect to sectoral
averages
Data: CERVED and OECD
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Figure 18: TFP gains from equalising TFP dispersion to its 1995 value
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Figure 19: TFP gains from equalising TFP dispersion to its 1995 value, by
firm size
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Figure 20: TFP gains from equalising TFP dispersion to its 1995 value, by
geographic area
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